

## Japan's Defense Policy: Abe the Evolutionary

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's historic April visit to Washington capped the most significant two-year period in Japan's defense reform in decades. Since his unlikely return as prime minister in December 2012, Abe has declared that "Japan is back," expressed his desire for it to be a "first-tier" power, and sketched out an ambitious vision for a U.S.–Japan "Alliance of Hope."<sup>1</sup> With the April announcement of new Guidelines for U.S.–Japan Defense Cooperation and two major security bills currently under debate in Japan's Diet, 2015 is already a historic year for Japanese defense policy and the U.S.–Japan alliance.<sup>2</sup>

To some, bold defense reforms under Abe make him Japan's most transformative leader since post-WWII Occupation-era Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida.<sup>3</sup> No doubt, the Abe administration's accomplishments are many. Since December 2013, Japan has established a National Security Council and released its first-ever National Security Strategy, championing a new doctrine of "Proactive Contributions to Peace"; updated the seminal 2010 National Defense Program Guidelines; passed a controversial secrets protection law; and significantly revised a decades-old ban on arms exports. Last July, Abe's Cabinet "reinterpreted" Article 9 of Japan's Constitution to partially lift a longstanding, self-imposed prohibition on exercising the U.N.-sanctioned right to collective self-defense. These reforms have culminated in April's *Guidelines*—the first update since 1997—and the now-pending slate of security legislation.

---

Adam P. Liff is Assistant Professor at Indiana University's School of Global and International Studies (SGIS), Postdoctoral Fellow in the Princeton-Harvard China and the World Program, and Associate-in-Research at Harvard University's Reischauer Institute of Japanese Studies and Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies. He can be reached at [aliff@indiana.edu](mailto:aliff@indiana.edu). Follow him @AdamPLiff. For helpful feedback on earlier drafts, the author thanks Zack Cooper, Brad Glosserman, James Mayger, Sheila Smith, and Yuki Tatsumi.

---

Copyright © 2015 The Elliott School of International Affairs  
*The Washington Quarterly* • 38:2 pp. 79–99  
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2015.1064711>

A polarizing figure, Abe's efforts have sparked controversy at home and abroad. Where critics see a radical departure from Japan's post-war "pacifism" likely to involve it in foreign wars, proponents see long overdue reforms necessary for Japan's security as it confronts an increasingly "severe" security environment. Abe's efforts have even led some to accuse him of expansionism and militarization, even militarism. The polemical nature of the contemporary discourse raises three fundamental questions:

- How transformative are Japan's security reforms under Abe?
- What is driving these developments?
- What are their practical implications for Japan's role in the U.S.–Japan alliance, and its contributions to regional and global security?

Commentary on Japan's defense policy too often generates more heat than light, while critics and proponents tend to talk past one another. In all this noise, the practical implications of recent developments are often lost.

Far from constituting an abrupt transformation of Japan's defense policy, recent measures adopted during the Abe era to large extent continue long-term trends initiated by previous governments from both his Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the leading opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). They reflect a significant, but evolutionary, rationalization of defense policy driven by growing concerns about regional security because of perceived threats from North Korea's increasingly advanced nuclear and missile programs, a shifting regional military balance, and China's maritime advancement and efforts to assert its sovereignty claims in the South and East China Seas. Other important factors include lessons learned from two decades of the Japan's Self-Defense Forces' (JSDF) gradually expanding regional and global missions and a desire to maximize efficiencies in response to the changing nature and rising costs of military technology, fiscal constraints, a shrinking and aging population, and the Japanese public's persistent, deep-seated skepticism about military power. In response to these challenges, Abe and his predecessors have pursued incremental changes to bolster deterrence, to deepen cooperation and interoperability with the United States as well as other partners, and to facilitate a more rapid, flexible, and effective response to a range of perceived traditional and non-traditional security threats.

Furthermore, a flawed yet widespread focus exclusively on *changes* to Japan's security policy overlooks the persistence of strict, long-standing, and self-imposed constraints within which political leaders pursue these reforms. Rumors of their demise to the contrary, recent developments have stretched, but not removed, core principles that for decades have defined Japan's self-restraint. As cases-in-point, political leaders still prohibit the JSDF from using military force outside a singular, narrow interpretation of self-defense, or developing—much

less employing—offensive power projection or nuclear weapons. Though practically significant and historic in a Japanese context, recent reforms—up to and including collective self-defense—are, at most, reactive realism within strict normative bounds. Seventy years after Japan's surrender, the public remains deeply skeptical about the employment of military power as a tool of foreign policy.

**Recent developments have stretched, but not removed, Japan's core principles of self-restraint.**

## **A Gradual Evolution**

Assessments of Japanese defense reforms under Abe that ignore the historical, strategic, and domestic political context in which they occur risk misdiagnosing key drivers and exaggerating the pace and scale of change underway, as well as the personal significance of Abe himself. This is not “all about Abe.” Indeed, the basic trend of Japan's defense posture, reforms of security-relevant institutions, and gradual expansion of the geographical and substantive scope of JSDF operations significantly predates Abe's return as prime minister in December 2012. Since the end of the Cold War, Japan's leaders have made incremental changes designed to ensure that the JSDF and U.S.–Japan alliance adapt to changing regional and global threats. Abe's current efforts build on and accelerate this now decades-long trend. Actively encouraged by Washington, increasingly these initiatives not only receive broad support from Abe's LDP colleagues, but also find moderate support across the political spectrum. Indeed, the leading opposition DPJ initiated several of the most significant reforms currently underway during its period as the ruling party in 2009–2012.

Lately, much talk has centered on Abe's ambition to turn Japan into a “normal nation,” his foreign policy doctrine of “proactive contributions to peace,” and the 2015 U.S.–Japan Defense Guidelines' explicit reference to a “global” alliance. Yet, these concepts have been part of elite debates about Japan's security policy for a generation. JSDF minesweeping in the Persian Gulf in 1991—after hostilities ended—and participation in UN Peacekeeping missions since 1992 marked the beginning of a gradual evolution of JSDF roles and missions from a strict focus on territorial defense to regional and global operations that are outside conflict zones and don't require the use of lethal force. Especially after 9/11, leaders further expanded the JSDF's role to include deployments to post-conflict reconstruction in Iraq, refueling operations in the Indian Ocean to support coalition forces involved in Operation Enduring Freedom, and regional and global humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) operations. In 2009, the JSDF joined a multinational anti-piracy operation

in the Gulf of Aden, even establishing Japan's first overseas base since 1945 in support. Landmark legislation passed that summer allowed Japan to protect vessels from acts of piracy without regard to nationality.

Other significant, alliance-related measures adopted by Abe's LDP predecessors included the 1996 Japan–U.S. Declaration on Security and a major revision of the 1978 Guidelines for U.S.–Japan Defense Cooperation in 1997.<sup>4</sup> Both were a response primarily to North Korea's nuclear program and the increased prospect of conflict on the Korean Peninsula. A DPRK missile launched over Japan in 1998 shocked Washington and Tokyo into adopting unprecedented measures to enhance defense equipment cooperation and interoperability, especially concerning ballistic missile defense R&D. By the mid-2000s, the allies had identified new common strategic objectives and discussed "alliance transformation" as part of a major Defense Policy Review Initiative. Tokyo also carved an exception out of its self-imposed, decades-old Three Principles on Arms Exports (aka the "Arms Export Ban") to allow joint development of missile defense interceptors with the United States.<sup>5</sup> In the wake of 9/11, Japan also implemented numerous security-relevant legal reforms not only to bolster its own ability to respond to crises but also to support its U.S. ally. And during his first term in office (2006–2007), Abe upgraded Japan's Defense Agency to a full ministry, which is perhaps the most significant institutional reform prior to establishing Japan's National Security Council (NSC) last year.

Not limited to the conservative LDP, the left-of-center DPJ also accelerated defense policy reforms during its three years as Japan's ruling party (2009–2012) in response to perceived worsening threats to Japan's security, especially from China and North Korea. These DPJ efforts lay much of the groundwork

**Abe's LDP predecessors and the DPJ have both accelerated defense policy reforms recently.**

for reforms implemented by Abe since 2012. Particularly significant was the 2010 National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), which reconceived Japan's basic defense orientation toward active deterrence and a highly mobile "dynamic defense force" capable of responding rapidly to a threat anywhere in Japan—especially its remote southwestern islands near China. This approach catalyzed a long overdue reorientation of JSDF posture southwest, away from passive deterrence of a Soviet invasion of the northern

island of Hokkaido. The NDPG also mainstreamed the concept of "gray-zone" contingencies—situations that are not peacetime but which remain below the threshold of armed attack. (Both concepts are central to major documents since released under Abe.)

In 2011, the DPJ also further relaxed the Three Principles on Arms Exports to facilitate cooperation with Washington on ballistic missile defense and Japan's involvement in the Joint Strike Fighter program. In response to multiple North Korean missile tests, the DPJ deployed land- and sea-based PAC-3 and SM-3 interceptors. In 2012, its defense minister ordered the JSDF to shoot down a missile if it threatened Japan's territory. And in late 2012, it was DPJ leaders who initiated the long overdue review of the obsolescent 1997 U.S.–Japan Guidelines to better address the new security environment and the allies' respective capabilities. (The new Guidelines were released on April 27, 2015.)

Over a two-decade period predating Abe's current tenure as prime minister, his predecessors implemented numerous reforms. These efforts were aimed at gradually rationalizing Japan's defense policy and relevant institutions—unilaterally and in concert with its U.S. ally—in order to better deter and, if necessary, confront emerging regional and global threats.

## **Abe Returns (December 2012–Present)**

---

Since returning to power in December 2012, Abe has built on and accelerated these defense reforms. A critical mass of elite support has catalyzed Abe's efforts. Especially salient factors driving these trends are North Korea's advancing nuclear and missile programs as well as increasingly provocative Chinese assertions of its claim to islands that Japan administers in the East China Sea.<sup>6</sup> Abe wasted no time. Within a year, his administration established three major pillars of Japan's security policy today: Japan's first-ever NSC, its first-ever comprehensive National Security Strategy (NSS), and an updated National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG). Many associated reforms trace their roots to previous administrations.

### **New Institutions<sup>7</sup>**

The NSC's establishment in December 2013 is Japan's most significant security-relevant institutional reform in recent memory. It originated in a 2007 bill introduced during Abe's first term, but which his successor set aside. The NSC replaces the Security Council, established in 1986 to strengthen the Cabinet's control over foreign policy but widely criticized as ineffectual, ad-hoc, and rarely convening—even during major crises.<sup>8</sup> In contrast, the new NSC is a standing body tasked with centralizing national security policy decision-making and ensuring rapid and effective inter-agency planning and coordination. The large National Security Secretariat attracts top bureaucratic talent seconded from other government organizations, especially the ministries of foreign affairs and defense. At the NSC's core is a biweekly "Four-Minister Meeting" bringing

together the prime minister, foreign minister, defense minister, and chief cabinet secretary for regular consultations on security affairs. In a crisis, a new “Emergency Situations Minister Meeting” can form involving relevant personnel. Though still in its infancy, the NSC’s inter-agency process ameliorates notorious bureaucratic sectionalism across Japan’s policymaking apparatus and plays a critical role in medium- and long-term strategic planning—something Japan has lacked historically. In addition to managing the Secretariat and inter-agency process, the new national security advisor also

**The roots of Abe’s defining “proactive contributions to peace” doctrine are actually decades old.**

serves as a direct, high-level diplomatic pipeline to other governments, including the United States.

The NSC is tasked with implementing Japan’s new NSS and the 2013 NDPG. Both documents’ organizing principle is “proactive contributions to peace” (*sekkyokuteki heiwashugi*)—a call for Japan to contribute to the “peace, stability and prosperity of the international community” in a manner commensurate with its global political and economic standing.<sup>9</sup> Though considered Abe’s

defining foreign policy doctrine, its rhetorical roots are actually decades-old and its substance builds off more than twenty years of Japanese international cooperation missions. While recognizing the “indispensable” role that the U.S.–Japan alliance plays in Japan’s and regional peace and security, the NSS also emphasizes the importance of “building trust and cooperative relations with other partners,” especially fellow democracies Australia, South Korea, and India, as well as the countries of ASEAN.<sup>10</sup> That said, the NSS also defines stable Sino–Japanese relations as “essential” for regional peace and stability.<sup>11</sup>

Released a year after Beijing began unprecedented, provocative efforts in September 2012 to assert its sovereignty claim in the East China Sea, the 2013 NDPG and its associated Medium Term Defense Program build on their 2010 DPJ-generated predecessors by continuing Japan’s defense posture reorientation to the southwestern region and slightly modifying the “dynamic defense force” concept to stress the importance of joint operations of the Ground, Air, and Maritime Self-defense Forces. The importance of maritime and air superiority as well as amphibious capabilities to deter and, if necessary, repel an island invasion feature prominently.<sup>12</sup> In indirect reference to concerns about a possible landing of Chinese personnel on the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu in Chinese), the NDPG identifies seamless U.S.–Japan cooperation in response to “gray-zone situations” as an urgent task.<sup>13</sup> Since their release, procurement patterns have reflected Japan’s shifting priorities.<sup>14</sup>

**Secrets Protection Legislation, Arms Exports, and Strategic ODA**

Other major developments since Abe's return to the prime ministership include the December 2013 passage of a controversial law to protect specially designated state secrets, a revision of the Three Principles of Arms Exports, and a new Development Cooperation Charter in February 2015. All were designed to support NSS objectives.

The secrecy legislation, which came into force in December 2014, proved contentious at home due to concerns that public access to information about government activities would be weakened in the name of national security.<sup>15</sup> Among its proponents, however, it was seen as a necessity given Japan's historically light penalties for disclosure of sensitive information. Internally, the legislation was intended to deter leaks and facilitate intelligence-sharing across government agencies. Externally, it was intended to facilitate closer intelligence-sharing with the United States. Indeed, Washington had called for reforms for decades.

The April 2014 "Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology" significantly loosened Japan's decades-old, self-imposed 1967 "Arms Export Ban."<sup>16</sup> The 2014 revision builds on past relaxations and exemptions implemented by previous DPJ and LDP governments—most recently in 2011 and 2005—in the context of perceived worsening external threats, surging costs of modern defense technology, and negligible prospects for major increases to Japan's defense spending. In response, it was designed to rationalize Japan's notoriously inefficient defense procurement, to generate greater economies of scale from domestic production by allowing overseas sales, to maximize access to the best equipment through international collaboration, and to enhance capacity building of regional partners.

Japan's new Development Cooperation Charter, an important revision of the Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) Charter, for the first time allowed Japan to provide assistance to foreign militaries—albeit only for nontraditional security missions (e.g., disaster relief, anti-piracy).<sup>17</sup> It formalized and accelerated trends dating back a decade, such as a 2006 transfer of patrol vessels to Indonesia—itself an exemption previously carved out of the Three Principles on Arms Export.<sup>18</sup>

**Collective Self-defense**

To many, the clearest sign of Abe's supposedly radical departure from Japan's "pacifism"—and certainly the one that has received the most global media attention—was a July 2014 Cabinet resolution reinterpreting Article 9 of Japan's Constitution to partially lift a longstanding, self-imposed ban on collective self-defense.<sup>19</sup> This resolution constitutes an important shift. But it is far from unexpected or abrupt. To some leading analysts, collective

**To some, collective self-defense has already been Japan's de facto national policy for a decade.**

self-defense has already been Japan's "de facto national policy" for a decade.<sup>20</sup> Regardless, the practical significance of last July's *partial* lifting of the self-imposed ban on collective self-defense is likely to be far less than many critics suggest.

Prior to the July 2014 Cabinet Resolution, the Japanese government's position for decades had been that Japan possessed *the right* to collective self-defense—afforded by the UN Charter to *all* sovereign states and a right recognized explicitly in the 1951 U.S.–

Japan security treaty—but that its exercise was considered unconstitutional. The erstwhile (1972) rationale was that collective self-defense exceeded the scope of a landmark 1954 constitutional interpretation allowing Japan only to develop and employ military capabilities not exceeding the minimum level necessary for self-defense. This interpretation and its persistence in the decades since reflect both the "pacifist" spirit of Article 9 of Japan's 1947 Constitution, promulgated during the U.S. Occupation, and widespread popular opposition to any efforts to place Japan's post-war military trajectory on a more "normal" path.

Behind last July's Cabinet Resolution was an emerging consensus among Japanese foreign policy elites that as the nature and severity of perceived threats and military technologies evolve, so too must the real-world interpretation of what defines the capabilities "minimally necessary" to ensure Japan's security. In this view, Japan has no choice but to deepen cooperation with other countries to deter potential threats and, if necessary, defend itself. As the Resolution states explicitly, "No country can secure its own peace only by itself."<sup>21</sup> In particular, from the government's perspective, partially lifting the ban was necessary to strengthen the alliance politically and operationally and, in the event of a crisis, to enable more effective JSDF support of U.S. forces engaged in defending Japan—especially in scenarios involving ballistic missile defense (against a growing North Korean threat) and maritime security (primarily in response to China's growing naval power and tensions in the East China Sea).<sup>22</sup>

Precisely how last year's reinterpretation will shape Japan's defense policy is uncertain until security legislation introduced into the Diet in May 2015 (more on this later) is passed and implemented. However, based on the Cabinet Resolution and despite the hype, the practical implications appear limited. Domestic resistance, especially from the LDP's coalition partner, compelled the Abe Cabinet to stipulate three strict conditions for exercising CSD: Japan's survival (*kuni no sonritsu*) is threatened; no alternative means of addressing the threat exist; and whatever force Japan uses will be limited to the minimum necessary.<sup>23</sup> As an indicator of the operational constraints the JSDF will continue to face when kinetic lethal force against threats not directly risking Japan's survival are at issue,



Abe has stated explicitly that Japanese use of military force even in UN Security Council-sanctioned collective security operations (e.g., the 1991 Persian Gulf War) will never happen. By adopting this position, Abe rejected the advice of his own advisory panel, stating that such operations are not “logically consistent with the Government’s constitutional interpretation,” especially a threat to *Japan* as a precondition for JSDF deployment.<sup>24</sup> This all suggests that the practical significance for the JSDF’s global roles and missions of last year’s reinterpretation is likely to fall far short of what many critics claim.

Constitutional reinterpretation was (and remains) generally opposed by the Japanese public, but was backed by 81 percent of democratically-elected Diet members.<sup>25</sup> The change is controversial, to be sure, especially on Constitutional grounds. But in terms of its practical implications it appears evolutionary and logically consistent with past government interpretations of Article 9. The three conditions stipulate that use of force will be limited to situations when Japan faces an existential threat. Furthermore, simply *allowing* exercise of the right does not necessarily mean political leaders will ever actually choose to do so. Even in instances where the U.S. military is engaged, the lack of a joint U.S.–Japan command affords Tokyo flexibility to decide whether, and how, it will support Washington militarily.

### **U.S.–Japan Guidelines for Defense Cooperation**

The April 2015 U.S.–Japan Guidelines are the result of intense bilateral negotiations since October 2013 and follow an extensive review initiated by the DPJ in 2012. They are designed to reflect changes to the regional and global security environment since the last Guidelines were promulgated in 1997, and are intended to bolster deterrence, guarantee Japan’s peace and security across a spectrum of possible contingencies, and promote peace and stability in the Asia–Pacific region and beyond. They encapsulate all four aspects of Japan’s gradually evolving security policy: responding to external and internal challenges by doubling down on its alliance with Washington through deepened bilateral defense cooperation and military interoperability, expanding bilateral and multilateral cooperation with regional partners, embracing a more proactive role in regional and global security cooperation, and reforming institutions to bolster deterrence and crisis response.

Four specific features of the Guidelines are especially salient:

- 1) Establishing a standing Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM) and upgrading the bilateral planning mechanism to facilitate faster, more flexible, seamless, and whole-of-government responses to contingencies running the gamut from major natural disasters to gray zones to armed attack;
- 2) Explicitly expanding the substantive scope of cooperation to include ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance), intelligence-sharing,

counterterrorism, peacekeeping, capacity building, HA/DR, and the new strategic domains of space and cyberspace;

- 3) In accordance with the July 2014 Cabinet Resolution on collective self-defense, allowing Tokyo to assist U.S. and other countries' military assets that come under attack while "engaged in activities that contribute to the defense of Japan";<sup>26</sup>
- 4) A call for the United States and Japan to deepen bilateral and multilateral cooperation with regional partners and to adopt a leading role in regional and global activities—especially nontraditional security operations and partner capacity building.

In response to changing regional and global security challenges, the 2015 Guidelines look set to open significant avenues for defense cooperation and enhanced interoperability. The new ACM and deepening bilateral and multilateral cooperation as a result of pending security legislation are particularly noteworthy. Beyond that, however, the Guidelines largely formalize and accelerate key trends in U.S.–Japan cooperation which alliance watchers have observed for years.

### **2015 Security Legislation**

Unsurprisingly, opposition parties immediately criticized Abe for announcing the ambitious bilateral Guidelines in Washington before security legislation based on the 2014 Cabinet Resolution on collective self-defense had even been introduced at home, much less passed into law. The Guidelines themselves are merely broad outlines of the allies' respective responsibilities and procedures for operational coordination—they are not the final say on policy, and create neither legal rights nor obligations for either side. Associated policies are susceptible to legislative review. The Diet has often acted as a "break" (*hadome*) on the security policy ambitions of past conservative LDP leaders. Whether Abe's Cabinet will get what it wants remains to be seen.

To provide a legal foundation for the Cabinet resolution and Guidelines, in May Japan's Cabinet introduced two major security bills. The first, a "Permanent International Peace Support Law," is intended to enable the JSDF to provide logistic support to multinational forces with prior Diet approval but without the need to formulate and debate ad hoc "special measures laws" each time. The second is an omnibus bill that effectively revises ten existing laws, including a new version of the "Armed Attack Situation Response Law" encapsulating the three new conditions for limited exercise of collective self-defense.<sup>27</sup> In aggregate, the now-pending package stands to provide legal sanction for the JSDF to deploy more rapidly, operate more broadly in terms of scope and geography, and under certain conditions expand Japan's freedom to provide

logistical support to foreign militaries or choose to defend U.S. and other “friendly” forces against armed attack. It would also deepen the JSDF’s involvement in peacekeeping, including and beyond UNPKO and humanitarian operations overseas.

Relative to the hype and despite being disparaged by critics as everything from a “threat to regional peace” to “war legislation,” the proposed changes appear to entail a moderate expansion of JSDF roles and missions. Indeed, even if the package passes without amendment, severe constraints on JSDF operations are likely to persist. For example, under the proposed permanent law even logistical support activities must be sanctioned by a UN General Assembly or Security Council resolution, and withheld when the multinational forces are engaged in actual combat.<sup>28</sup> Meanwhile, the limitations imposed on the scope of acceptable operations by the three collective self-defense conditions manifest in Abe’s stance that JSDF deployment to foreign territory or waters for the purpose of using force remains unconstitutional. The sole exception under discussion is a hypothetical Middle East conflict scenario in which maritime commerce through the Strait of Hormuz—through which 80 percent of Japan’s crude oil shipments pass—is blocked. Yet even in this case the JSDF’s role would be limited to passive minesweeping, and based on statements by Cabinet ministers it would be deployed only in the remarkable event Japan was unable to import oil for a period of six months or more.<sup>29</sup>

Whether the Cabinet will succeed in pushing these measures through the Diet remains to be seen. As of this writing, controversy surrounding the proposed bills’ constitutionality and public frustration with the government’s explanation of the legislation looks likely to force the Government to extend the Diet’s current ordinary session—scheduled to end June 24—and to postpone its passage to August or beyond. Abe can either exploit his two-thirds Lower House majority to force it through, or slow things down to build support. Even if the entire package passes without being watered down, the JSDF is likely to remain strictly operationally constrained.

## Maintaining the Core

---

The actual substance of recent developments belies the tendency of contemporary discourse to exaggerate the extent to which defense reforms under Abe constitute a radical departure from past practice. At the extreme, some see Japan under Abe as returning to militarism and threatening regional peace and stability.<sup>30</sup> The reality, however, is that Japan’s security policy remains far more self-restrained than any other major economic power. Despite widespread concerns within Japan about North Korea and China that now transcend traditional ideological divides, solid majorities staunchly oppose a fundamental transformation of the JSDF’s capabilities and missions. Public

## Five fundamental elements of Japan's post-war defense policy remain intact.

support for strict, longstanding, and self-imposed constraints remains robust. Recent policies spearheaded by elites have at most stretched these constraints, not removed them. Abe and his colleagues continue to operate within strict normative bounds.

A tendency of observers to focus exclusively on *change*—especially new and complicated issues such as the 2014 Cabinet resolution on collective self-defense—without appropriate baselining leads many to exaggerate the pace and scale of recent reforms, as well as Abe's individual significance. More fundamentally, it leads many to ignore the persistence of core principles. In contrast, examining an alternative set of metrics representing decades-old, defining elements of Japan's post-war defense policy reveals a picture at odds with conventional wisdoms. Despite recent policy shifts, five fundamental elements remain intact.

The first element involves respective obligations under the 1960 U.S.–Japan Mutual Security Treaty. The 2015 Guidelines stipulate that the two allies' respective obligations remain basically unchanged. Detering and, if necessary, responding to “an armed attack against either Party *in the territories under the administration of Japan*” (emphasis added) continues to constitute the alliance's primary mandate.<sup>31</sup> Despite recent hype, both the 2014 Cabinet Resolution and the Guidelines state that exercise of the right of CSD will be limited to instances in which *Japan's* security is at risk. In other words, when Japan is not itself directly threatened (e.g., an attack on the U.S. homeland) it is still not obligated to support the U.S. militarily.

Second, strict, self-imposed prohibitions remain on the conditions under which “use of force” (*buryoku koshi*) is allowed. The government still judges that the JSDF's employment of lethal military force outside a narrow interpretation of the “minimum necessary” for self-defense is unconstitutional. Though pending legislation may allow limited logistical support for U.S. combat operations (*ittaiika*), direct JSDF involvement in kinetic conflict will be limited to extreme cases. Abe himself has stated that collective security operations remain unconstitutional. And despite widespread claims that ISIS's tragic beheadings of two Japanese nationals in February 2015 was “Japan's 9/11” and would shock the country into supporting major policy shifts, the JSDF may remain prohibited even from hostage rescue missions. Severe restrictions on small-arms use in anything except strict self-defense may also persist.<sup>32</sup>

Third, the 2015 Guidelines stress that Japan's longstanding doctrine of “exclusive defense” (*senshu boei*) remains “fundamental policy” (*kihontekina hoshin*).<sup>33</sup> In particular, Tokyo's self-imposed prohibition on “offensive” platforms that other major powers have taken for granted (e.g., aircraft

carriers, ICBMs, strategic bombers) persists on the grounds that such capabilities threaten other states by exceeding the “minimum necessary” threshold. Remarkably, the Guidelines did not mention the possibility of Japan acquiring strike capabilities, despite years of discussions among defense planners concerning their desirability given the growing threat of a nuclear-tipped North Korean ballistic missile.

Fourth, the “Three Non-nuclear Principles” (*hikaku san gensoku*) are also still deemed a “fundamental policy.”<sup>34</sup> The 2015 Guidelines state that these principles—collectively a self-imposed prohibition on possession, production, and introduction (into Japanese territory) of nuclear weapons—remain in place.

The fifth element is the “1 percent Framework” on Japan’s defense spending (*1% waku*). Limiting defense spending to a comparatively low 1 percent of GDP is a normative, arbitrary ceiling imposed by a 1976 Cabinet resolution. Though the resolution was technically overturned in 1986, Japan’s actual defense budget has since remained at or below the 1 percent threshold. It currently ranks 102nd in the world on a percentage-of-GDP basis.<sup>35</sup> Despite widespread hype about Japan’s defense spending increases under Abe, culminating in an “all-time” high in 2015, since 2012 the defense budget has increased only ~1.9 percent per year—a moderate pace that follows *eleven* consecutive years of decline. In nominal yen terms, Japan’s 2015 defense budget remains lower than in 1997.<sup>36</sup> In contrast during the same period, China’s official defense budget grew from \$10 billion (one-fourth Japan’s) to \$142 billion (more than triple that of Japan).

Claims of a fundamental transformation to the contrary, the persistence of these core principles demonstrates that recent changes to Japan’s defense policy are moderate. Based on its leaders’ own amorphous definition, in the military domain Japan remains far from a “normal nation.” It certainly is not a threat to regional peace and stability, much less one warranting a narrative of a chauvinistic, militarist, or expansionist state desperate for status as a military great power. Such provocative claims—particularly common in Chinese media—distort reality and are themselves destabilizing. Though practically significant and historic in a Japanese context, recent defense reforms, up to and including limited exercise of collective self-defense, are best understood as evolutionary steps.

**P**rovocative claims about Japanese shifts distort reality and are themselves destabilizing.

Looking forward, principles and constraints on JSDF operations remain robust and enjoy widespread public support. Indeed, the new U.S.–Japan Defense Guidelines and possible further constitutional reinterpretation, to say nothing of actual revision of Article 9 or pursuit of independent military power, remain unpopular within Japan. Even current moderate efforts to change Japan’s

security policies face stiff domestic political headwinds. In a mid-April survey, only 29 percent of Japanese supported passage of now-pending security legislation.<sup>37</sup> March surveys by Abe's own Cabinet reveal only 30 percent support a more capable JSDF, while half oppose cooperative self-defense and efforts to expand the JSDF's overseas role. Two-in-three believe that even overseas nontraditional security operations should be maintained at their current level.<sup>38</sup> Meanwhile, less than a quarter feel the JSDF should be more active "helping to maintain peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region."<sup>39</sup> Even many proponents of recent shifts, including Abe himself, concede that last year's Cabinet resolution was at the upper limit for change without Constitutional revision. Yet, public support for revision has actually declined the past decade.<sup>40</sup>

The constraints on more ambitious policy shifts are manifest in Abe's own experiences. He returned to office in a 2012 landslide election victory intending to revise the Constitution's Article 9, yet soon abandoned his plan because of domestic opposition. As both strict conditions on exercise of collective self-defense and Abe's statement forbidding JSDF involvement in collective security operations demonstrate, public resistance and the LDP's ruling coalition partner, New Komeito—a pacifistic party whose leader declared that he would serve as the "brake" on loosened restrictions—have significantly influenced outcomes. Even with (unlikely) support from Komeito, the LDP may be hard-pressed to achieve even the first procedural step toward Constitutional revision, which is two-thirds majority support in both houses of the Diet. Belying the problems inherent in a simplistic narrative of Japan as increasingly "nationalistic," some analysts have even identified a shift toward liberal-center forces in recent months. As evidence, they point to Japan's nationalist right-wing party losing 17 of its 19 seats in the December 2014 election.<sup>41</sup> In short, even if pending security legislation passes in its current form, the stars hardly seem aligned for more ambitious changes to Japan's defense policies.

## Implications for the United States

---

On the eve of his April 2015 visit to Washington, Abe boldly proclaimed that "One plus one will finally become two,"<sup>42</sup> hinting that the new Defense Guidelines made Tokyo an equally committed alliance partner. Not quite. Though still not "equal" in the sense of a mutual defense pact, with recent reforms Washington and Tokyo have achieved important progress in bilateral defense cooperation. The times have indeed changed. In 1981, domestic backlash in Japan against mere reference to the relationship as an "alliance" compelled Japan's foreign minister to resign. Nowadays, its leaders respond to an increasingly uncertain, severe security environment by doubling-down on the alliance. In the abstract, the Japanese public is on board. Polls show support for

the security treaty at 83 percent—an all-time high.<sup>43</sup> Though these ratings do not translate into majority support for most specific policies intended to strengthen it, they provide political leaders with room to maneuver.

Though the devil is in the details of Japan's pending security legislation and its subsequent implementation, reforms underway stand to enhance Japan's ability to contribute to regional and global security alone and in concert with its U.S. ally. The 2015 Guidelines build on two decades of gradual progress to launch bilateral cooperation into a new stage, opening avenues for more robust, flexible, and effective defense cooperation in traditional and nontraditional security. Together with last year's Constitutional reinterpretation, they are likely to bolster deterrence by expanding the scope of bilateral and multilateral training and exercises. Institutionally, the alliance's new standing coordination and upgraded bilateral planning mechanisms pave the way for enhanced interoperability, information sharing, inter-agency coordination, and crisis management. Recognizing space and cyber as new domains evinces cooperation actively tailored to address 21st-century threats. Pending legislation would provide the legal foundation for Tokyo to make new commitments to more active, integrated support of U.S. and other nations' armed forces logistically and, in cases where they are "engaged in activities that contribute to the defense of Japan," for defensive kinetic force.<sup>44</sup>

Independent of Washington, Abe and his predecessors have implemented important reforms to security-relevant institutions and rationalized JSDF force structure and posture. The new NSC allows Japan to independently formulate comprehensive national security strategy, enhance inter-agency coordination and intelligence-sharing, and respond to various crises more rapidly and effectively. Shifting JSDF force posture southwest and prioritizing air and maritime assets bolsters deterrence and reduces reaction time in a possible East China Sea contingency. Regionally, in response to widespread recognition of growing security interdependence, Japan is deepening ties with U.S. partners through bilateral and multilateral training and exercises, expanded defense equipment and technology cooperation, and capacity building. This creates space for a more active role in Asia-Pacific security.

If efforts to enshrine in law collective self-defense and an expanded menu of roles and missions for the JSDF succeed, the implications for improved JSDF training, exercises, and readiness—independent of and together with other countries—could be significant. The pending "permanent law" would eliminate the need for time-consuming, ad hoc special measures laws each time leaders want to deploy the JSDF overseas in logistical support operations. Deployments would still require prior Diet approval, however. In aggregate, these measures are consistent with the Pentagon's 2014 call for security partners "to play greater and even leading roles in advancing mutual security interests."<sup>45</sup>

**Washington needs to appreciate three limitations on Japan or risk an expectations gap.**

---

Despite these many positive changes and (excessively) alacritous rhetoric from Abe himself, Washington must recognize that significant constraints on JSDF operations persist. Failure to appreciate three limitations in particular risks an expectations gap that could undermine recent progress, or in a crisis even the alliance itself.

First, unlike U.S. alliances with South Korea and NATO countries, the U.S.–Japan security

treaty is not a mutual defense pact. The lack of a joint, combined command coupled with separate chains-of-command limit interoperability. Though the new ACM may partially plug this hole, its ultimate form and efficacy are uncertain. As for collective self-defense, the key word here is “self.” Based on the 2014 Cabinet resolution, the conditions under which the Japanese government can actually exercise collective self-defense in support of even the United States are limited—analogueous to those for *individual* self-defense, a right considered constitutional since 1954 but which Japan has never actually exercised. Japan still makes no advance commitment to use force in defense of its ally when Japan’s own security is not directly threatened. As the Guidelines stipulate, “each” party will decide—presumably separately—whether “to take actions involving the use of force.”<sup>46</sup> For Japan, the decision rests on a political judgment call, not an obligation.

Second, though much has been made of the Guidelines’ emphasis on a “global” alliance, the document says little about how the allies will actually cooperate regionally or globally.<sup>47</sup> Barring a direct threat to national security, Japan’s global security role will primarily be limited to logistical support. Under the new interpretation, Abe himself has explicitly ruled out JSDF participation in collective security operations such as the first Persian Gulf War. Even minesweeping in a Strait of Hormuz contingency or logistical support in a hot zone may not survive the current Diet debate. Together with low public enthusiasm, stiffening domestic social headwinds, and an apparently firm upper bound on defense spending, this all suggests that JSDF personnel will probably not be engaged in combat alongside their U.S. counterparts globally anytime soon.

Finally, though pending legislation may accelerate JSDF deployments, it appears that in most cases, advance Diet approval will still be necessary. The persistent gap between Japanese elite and popular sentiment on defense issues suggests that politics could hamstring JSDF contributions, which may emerge as wedge issues in future elections. These questions will remain political.



These important caveats notwithstanding, reforms underway stand to enhance Japan's ability to contribute to regional and global security independently and together with the United States. Even so, political leaders should keep their eyes on the bigger picture. The interests of both countries and regional and global peace and stability are served most effectively by a strong alliance *and* politically stable, mutually-beneficial relations with Japan's neighbors—especially China and Korea. Washington and Tokyo's challenge is to bolster alliance cooperation and deterrence without exacerbating regional tensions or undermining popular support within Japan for further reforms. Proactive diplomatic engagement and transparency are crucial. The allies must also prevent expectations gaps that could undermine the alliance in a crisis. In particular, U.S. leaders should appreciate the nuances surrounding the practically significant, but *limited*, changes underway, as well as the deep-seated domestic sensitivities that persist. They must neither exaggerate changes, nor assume that they are irreversible.

**A persistent gap exists between Japanese elite and popular sentiment on defense issues.**

## **Abe the Evolutionary**

Defense reforms under Abe are practically significant, but limited. His own occasionally hyperbolic rhetoric to the contrary, they build on and accelerate evolutionary steps taken by his LDP *and* DPJ predecessors. These changes occur in the context of an emerging critical mass of elite consensus about the external threats and internal challenges confronting Japan and what measures are necessary to ensure its security in a rapidly changing security environment. Assisted by a unified LDP still smarting from its 2009 defeat and a weak, disorganized opposition unsure of its positions, these trends have allowed Abe to stretch Japan's longstanding, self-imposed constraints on the JSDF's role—perhaps to their limit.

Yet, contemporary discourse on Japan's security policy changes often generates more heat than light, presenting a distorted picture of a complicated reality. In particular, both Abe's individual significance and the extent to which his accomplishments entail a revolutionary transformation of Japanese security policy are exaggerated. Widespread hype and rumors of its demise to the contrary, the decades-old core of Japanese security policy is still largely intact. Nor does it appear to be on life support, as reflected in public opinion polls and widespread opposition to employment of military force beyond strict self-

defense, offensive power projection, and nuclear weapons. Japan remains exceptionally self-restrained in the military domain.

Exaggerating the pace and scale of change and misdiagnosing causes can have real-world consequences. Doing so risks—and is sometimes exploited to justify—destabilizing overreactions by Japan’s neighbors. For their parts, Washington and Tokyo should remain vigilant in preventing expectation gaps that could, in a crisis, undermine the alliance. Already of concern are recent statements from U.S. officials and Congressional leaders implying that the alliance now entails a Japanese commitment to defend U.S. territory, or calling for JSDF combat operations on the Korean Peninsula.<sup>48</sup> Meanwhile, the stiff headwinds that security legislation currently faces in the Diet suggest a significant gap between Abe’s rhetoric as well as commitments made in the Guidelines, and the domestic political reality of what may be possible.

**Those waiting for Japan to emerge as a “Britain of the East” should probably make other plans.**

It remains to be seen whether pending security legislation gets significantly dialed back, represents a rigid upper bound on what is possible, or heralds a period of more fundamental change. Regardless, the remarkable persistence of the normative core of Japan’s security policy coupled with fiscal and demographic realities suggests that those waiting for Japan to emerge as a “Britain of the East” should probably make other plans. Japan may be undergoing a defense policy shift under Abe, but

both the Cassandras and the Pollyannas should sober up: it is at most a radically moderate one.

## Notes

1. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Japan Is Back,” Policy Speech by Shinzo Abe at CSIS in Washington, DC, February 22, 2013, [http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/pm/abe/us\\_20130222en.html](http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/pm/abe/us_20130222en.html); “Toward an Alliance of Hope,” Address by Shinzo Abe to the U.S. Congress Joint Session, Washington, D.C., April 29, 2015, [http://japan.kantei.go.jp/97\\_abe/statement/201504/uscongress.html](http://japan.kantei.go.jp/97_abe/statement/201504/uscongress.html).
2. “The Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation” (Department of Defense, April 27, 2015), [http://www.defense.gov/pubs/20150427\\_-\\_GUIDELINES\\_FOR\\_US-JAPAN\\_DEFENSE\\_COOPERATION\\_FINAL&CLEAN.pdf](http://www.defense.gov/pubs/20150427_-_GUIDELINES_FOR_US-JAPAN_DEFENSE_COOPERATION_FINAL&CLEAN.pdf).
3. Editorial Staff, “Abe Shinzo: Japan’s Most Consequential Prime Minister since Yoshida Shigeru,” *Asan Forum*, February 5, 2015, <http://www.theasanforum.org/abe-shinzo-japans-most-consequential-prime-minister-since-yoshida-shigeru/>.
4. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation,” 1997, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/guideline2.html>.
5. Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Japan,” November 2014, <http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/japan/delivery-systems/>.

6. Adam P. Liff and Andrew S. Erickson, "Crowding the Waters: The Need for Crisis Management in the East China Sea," *Foreign Affairs*, March 23, 2015, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/143285/adam-p-liff-and-andrew-s-erickson/crowding-the-waters>.
7. For an overview and links to English translations of key documents, see Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "Japan's Security Policy," March 10, 2015, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/security/>.
8. Tsuyoshi Sunohara, *日本版NSCとは何か* [What is the Japan-style NSC?] (Tokyo: Shinchosha, 2014).
9. "National Security Strategy," December 17, 2013, 4, [http://japan.kantei.go.jp/96\\_abe/documents/2013/\\_icsFiles/afieldfile/2013/12/17/NSS.pdf](http://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/documents/2013/_icsFiles/afieldfile/2013/12/17/NSS.pdf).
10. *Ibid.*, pp. 20, 23.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 25.
12. Ministry of Defense (Japan), "National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2014 and Beyond (Summary)," December 17, 2013, 7–8, [http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/2014/pdf/20131217\\_e.pdf](http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/2014/pdf/20131217_e.pdf).
13. *Ibid.*, p. 4.
14. Michael J. Green, "Fixed Budget, Dynamic Defense in Japan," Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, March 18, 2015, <http://live.amcharts.com/YTNhY/>.
15. "Cabinet Approves State Secrecy Law Guidelines," *Japan Times*, October 14, 2014.
16. Takashi Shiraishi, "The Three Principles on Arms Exports: Why Are They Up for Replacement?," Nippon.com, March 31, 2014, <http://www.nippon.com/en/editor/f00027/>.
17. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "Development Cooperation Charter," June 12, 2015, [http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/page\\_000138.html](http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/page_000138.html).
18. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "Japan's ODA White Paper 2006," 2006, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/white/2006/ODA2006/html/honpen/hp202040400.htm>.
19. Reinterpreting Article 9 to facilitate more robust defense capabilities has precedent. See Adam P. Liff, "Watch This Space: 'collective Self-Defense,' Constitutional Reinterpretation, and Japan's Security Policy," PacNet (Honolulu, HI: Pacific Forum CSIS, June 26, 2014), <http://csis.org/publication/pacnet-48-watch-space-collective-self-defense-constitutional-reinterpretation-and-japans>; Richard J. Samuels, "Politics, Security Policy, and Japan's Cabinet Legislation Bureau: Who Elected These Guys, Anyway?\*", Working paper, JPRI, March 2004.
20. Richard J. Samuels, "Who Defines Japan's Past, And Future," *The National Interest*, May 26, 2015, <http://nationalinterest.org/print/feature/who-defines-japans-past-future-12964>.
21. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "Cabinet Decision on Development of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan's Survival and Protect Its People," July 1, 2014, [http://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/nsp/page23e\\_000273.html](http://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/nsp/page23e_000273.html).
22. Sheila A. Smith, "Reinterpreting Japan's Constitution," Asia Unbound, July 2, 2014, <http://blogs.cfr.org/asia/2014/07/02/reinterpreting-japans-constitution/>.
23. "Cabinet Decision."
24. "Press Conference by Prime Minister Abe," May 15, 2014, [http://japan.kantei.go.jp/96\\_abe/statement/201405/0515kaiken.html](http://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/statement/201405/0515kaiken.html).
25. "次の焦点、集団的自衛権行使への個別法整備～ [Next Focus, Preparing Individual Laws for Exercising Collective Self-Defense]," *Asahi Shimbun Digital*, July 1, 2014, <http://digital.asahi.com/articles/ASG713HMZG71UTFK00T.html>.
26. "The Guidelines for U.S.–Japan Defense Cooperation," 6.

27. “Two Security Bills Legislative Package, ‘3 New Conditions’ Specified [安保2法案 一括法「新3要件」明記],” *Yomiuri Shimbun*, May 11, 2015.
28. *Ibid.*
29. “Oil Cut-Off; Minesweeping after ‘Half-Year’ [石油途絶「半年」で機雷掃海],” *Jiji Press*, May 24, 2015.
30. For recent English-language examples, see “Abe’s March to Militarism,” *China Daily*, February 14, 2014; “Commentary: Japan’s New Defense Bills Pose Threat to Regional Peace,” *Xinhua*, May 15, 2015; Debito Arudou, “U.S. Greenlights Japan’s March back to Militarism,” *Japan Times*, June 1, 2015. For their part, leading Japanese dailies characterized last July’s Cabinet resolution as placing Japan “on the road to war” or “reckless,” claiming that “once SDF troops launch operations there will be no limit to what they can do.” Cited in Richard J. Samuels, “Who Defines Japan’s Past, And Future,” *The National Interest*, May 26, 2015, <http://nationalinterest.org/print/feature/who-defines-japans-past-future-12964>.
31. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Japan-U.S. Security Treaty,” January 19, 1960, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/q&a/ref/1.html>.
32. “Gov’t Outlines SDF’s Use of Weapons in Helping Foreign Troops under Attack,” *Mainichi*, April 15, 2015.
33. “The Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation,” 2.
34. *Ibid.*
35. “The World Factbook,” Central Intelligence Agency, June 11, 2015, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ja.html>.
36. Ministry of Defense, “Defense Programs and Budget of Japan” (Tokyo, 2015), [http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d\\_budget/pdf/270414.pdf](http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_budget/pdf/270414.pdf).
37. “重要政策、理解進まず 集団の自衛権「賛成」29% [No Progress in Understanding Important Policies; 29% Support Collective Self-Defense],” *Nikkei Shimbun*, April 19, 2015.
38. “「自衛隊 防衛問題に関する世論調査」の概要 [Overview of ‘Opinion Survey Concerning JSDF/Defense Issues’]” (Tokyo: Cabinet Office Public Relations (Japan), March 2015), <http://survey.gov-online.go.jp/h26/h26-bouei/gairyaku.pdf>.
39. “Poll: Americans Divided over Japan’s Military Role in Asia,” *AP*, April 7, 2015, <http://news.yahoo.com/poll-americans-divided-over-japans-military-role-asia-133731881.html>.
40. *Yomiuri Shimbun* data from Brad Glosserman, “Abe Unleashed? Hardly,” *Asan Forum*, February 5, 2015, <http://www.theasanforum.org/abe-unleashed-hardly/>.
41. Kazuhiko Togo, “Abe’s Foreign and Security Policy Agenda,” *PacNet* (Honolulu, HI: Pacific Forum CSIS, December 29, 2014).
42. “How History Haunts Shinzo Abe’s Vision for Japan,” *Wall Street Journal*, April 26, 2015, <http://www.wsj.com/articles/how-history-haunts-shinzo-abes-vision-for-japan-1430076754>.
43. “Opinion Survey Concerning SDF/Defense Issues [自衛隊 防衛問題に関する世論調査],” Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, 2015, <http://survey.gov-online.go.jp/h26/h26-bouei/index.html>.
44. “The Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation,” 4.
45. “Quadrennial Defense Review 2014” (Department of Defense, 2014), iii.
46. “The Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation,” 16.

47. Yuki Tatsumi, "4 Takeaways From the New US-Japan Defense Guidelines," *The Diplomat*, April 29, 2015, <http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/4-takeaways-from-the-new-us-japan-defense-guidelines/>.
48. "McCain: SDF Should Expect to See Action in Korea, Deploy to Mideast, South China Sea," *Kyodo*, May 2, 2015.